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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Is an unsigned minute entry a final judgment or 
order from which an appeal can be taken? If not, may a party 
move to set aside the apparent ruling reflected in the unsigned 
minute entry? If so, are there any time constraints in doing so 
Or must a party wait until the Court has executed a written orde 
on the matter set out in the minute entry? And if the court 
refuses to set aside the unsigned minute entry and thereafter 
makes the ruling of the minute entry a judgment by signing and 
filing an order to that effect, may a party appeal said action 
within thirty (30) days after entry or filing of that order under 
Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P.? 
(2) Where the parties have stipulated, through their 
respective counsel, that the pretrial hearing should be stricken 
and continued without date until the parties have completed their 
desired discovery or until either party requests a pretrial 
conference, and such stipulation is on file before the court, and 
also communicated orally to the trial judge twice with his 
approval, may the trial judge properly dismiss the Plaintiffs' 
complaint with prejudice and on the merits when neither attorney 
and neither party appear at a pretrial conference from which they 
have been orally excused by the trial judge from attending, and 
when said pretrial conference was scheduled by the Trial Court 
Executive one month after the stipulation to remove the case from 
the pretrial calendar had been filed? 
(3) May the court dismiss with prejudice and on the 
4 
merits the Plaintiffs1 complaint when the Plaintiffs' attorney 
does not appear at a pretrial hearing? Does the fact that the 
attorney had talked to the District Judge a few days prior to the 
pretrial hearing and had been told by the District Judge that he 
did not need to appear have any bearing on the issue, either in 
law or equity? 
(4) Should the case be remanded for completion of 
discovery and trial, or should the dismissal be without 
prejudice, with provisions tolling any statute of limitations 
problems caused by the dismissal and the need to refile? Or 
should the dismissal with prejudice and on the merits be 
affirmed, despite the frequently stated standard that lawsuits 
should be disposed of on their merits and not by way of default? 
(5) Should the case be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute? If so, with or without prejudice? What effect on 
that determination would facts showing Defendants responsible for 
most delays, such as refusing to submit to depositions, obtaining 
protective orders, failing to answer "Interrogatories", and 
refusing to complete a verbal settlement agreement, etc. have? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
• I . -i wmi .umi •ftm n mm 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
of Beaver County dismissing the Plaintiffs1 complaint with 
prejudice and on the merits when neither party appeared for a 
pretrial conference on June 18, 1984, and from the denial of 
Plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the dismissal. The parties had 
previously filed with the Court a stipulation to vacate the 
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scheduled pretrial hearing and to not reschedule another pretri 
hearing until the parties completed their discovery or until 
either party filed new request for a pretrial hearing. The 
parties had also obtained the prior oral consent of the trail 
judge to be absent from the June 18, 1984 hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs are Charlie Brown, his wife Carma Browr 
and their Nevada corporation, Charlie Brown Construction. The 
Defendants are Conrad H. Koning, his wife Amy J. Koning, their 
Nevada Corporation, Leisure Sports Incorporated, and various 
associations formed to manage property sold in their subdivision 
at the Mt. Holly ski resort in Beaver County, Utah. The 
Plaintiffs will sometimes be referred to collectively as "Mr. 
Brown" or the "Browns", while the Defendants will sometimes be 
referred to as the "Konings". The Konings are the developers of 
the ski resort area. The Browns are the purchasers and owners of 
certain lots at the Mt. Holly ski resort, and filed a complaint 
to force Konings to complete road improvements that they 
allegedly represented would be done at their expense. 
The facts to support Browns1 appeal in this case are 
not in dispute. The "Affidavit of John L. Miles" filed February 
25, 1985 in support of the Browns "Motion To Set Aside Dismissal" 
was not challenged by the Konings at the hearing held March 18, 
1985. Further, Browns attorney proposed to take the stand and 
present sworn testimony to support the facts outlined on pages 
2-10 of the transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing (See 
T. 2: 6-8, also, T. 9: 17-20), but the Court accepted the 
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statement of facts presented by Browns1 attorney as if under 
oath, and the Konings did not care to challenge those facts (See 
T. 10: 13-17). Thus, the undisputed facts, as outlined in the 
transcript of the March 19, 1985 hearing (T. pp. 2-19) and as 
reflected in the pleadings, is substantially as follows. 
The Browns complaint was filed on June 15, 1981. 
Service of process was accomplished pursuant to Section 57-11-20, 
UCA, 1953, as amended. Konings filed a demand that Browns, 
non-residents of Utah, post a non-resident cost bond. The bond 
was posted and Konings answered. Browns1 attorney scheduled the 
taking of Mr. Koningfs deposition for June 14, 1982. The Konings 
attorney requested, and the Browns attorney granted, an extension 
to July 9, 1982. On July 8, 1982 Mr. Maycock, Konings1 attorney, 
telephoned Browns' attorney and stated that Konings would not 
appear at their deposition because a protective order had been 
issued in the United States Federal District Court allowing 
Konings to refuse to answer questions concerning the Mt. Holly 
Ski Resort. A "Motion For Protective Order" was filed the next 
day, July 9, 1982, which stated that the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah has issued a similar protective 
order. The scheduled depositions were therefore not taken. 
On April 4, 1983, Browns' attorney caused certain 
"Interrogatories" to be filed with the District Court. These 
interrogatories were mailed to Scott Thorley, Konings1 attorney. 
Mr. Thorley had previously filed a motion to withdraw as counsel 
for Konings, but no action had yet been taken by the Court on 
that motion. Mr. Thorley apparently did not forward the 
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"Interrogatories" on to Konings1 co-counself Mr. Maycock, to be 
answered, as Mr. Maycock later informed Browns1 attorney that he 
had not received the interrogatories. 
There being no court activity shown by the record in 
the case for seven months, the Court, sua sponte, issued an 
"Order To Show Cause" and also set a date for a pretrial hearing 
both scheduled to be heard on March 19, 1984. Prior to March 19 
1984 the attorneys for the parties discussed the case and the 
unanswered "Interrogatories". An agreement was reached and, due 
to time constraints, was communicated by telephone to District 
Court Judge J. Harlan Burns the morning of March 19, 1984, so 
that neither party would need to appear at the pretrial hearing. 
This agreement, or stipulation, was subsequently reduced to 
writing and filed with the Court on April 19, 1984. A 
transmittal letter dated March 19, 1984 was filed with the Court 
on March 22, 1984, and refers to the telephone call to Judge 
Burns and to the agreement made. That agreement, or stipulation, 
allowed Konings1 attorney thirty more days to answer the 
"Interrogatories" and goes on to state: 
"3. That this matter should be stricken from the 
Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties have 
completed their discovery or until either party 
requests a Pre-Trial Conference." 
On April 16, 1984, just 3 days before the above 
stipulation was filed with the Court by Konings1 attorney, the 
Court continued the pretrial hearing for 60 days. On April 30, 
1984 notice was mailed out getting the matter for trial on June 
18, 1984. Shortly thereafter, Browns' attorney telephoned 
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lelinda Kessock, the Trial Court Executive, and informed her of 
the agreement or stipulation (which by that time, was in the 
court file) to continue the matter until the parties had 
completed their discovery and requested a pretrial hearing. 
However, instead of vacating that date, she mailed a 
notice changing the June 18, 1984 date from a trial to a 
pretrial. On June 15, 1984, Browns1 attorney contacted Judge 
Burns on behalf of both attorneys (See "Affidavit of John L. 
Miles", paragraph 9, also, see T. 17: 21-23) and explained the 
agreement to continue the pretrial until either party requested a 
pretrial, and further informed the Court that the parties had 
worked out a settlement between themselves (See Exhibit P-8). 
This was done so both attorneys could be excused from attending 
the June 18, 1984 pretrial and to inform Judge Burns of the 
reason why neither attorney would appear on that date. Judge 
Burns stated there would be no need for the attorneys to appear 
under those circumstances. 
But, when no one appeared on June 18, 1984, the minute 
entry reflects that the case was dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. The Court apparently overlooked the stipulation in 
the file and had obviously forgotten the conversation of June 15, 
1984 with Mr. Miles in St. George, Utah. On June 28, 1984, the 
clerk of the Court mailed an unsigned minute entry indicating a 
dismissal with prejudice and on the merits. This minute entry 
did not come to the attention of Browns' attorney until sometime 
in January, 1985 (T. 7: 15-24, T. 8:14-17). Efforts were made to 
consult with Judge Burns on the matter and with Konings1 
9 
attorney (T. 8:18-25), who had in the meantime asked to withdraw 
as Konings1 attorney (the Court had taken no action on that 
request). These efforts were fruitless (See Exhibit P-13, also, 
T. 9: 1-4). 
The Browns then moved, on February 20, 1985, to set 
aside the dismissal by the unsigned minute entry. A hearing on 
that motion was held on March 18, 1985. The District Court 
denied the motion and affirmed the dismissal with prejudice and 
on the merits (See orders dated March 27, 1985 attached in the 
Addendum). These orders were filed April 4, 1985. Plaintiffs 
appeal those orders. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Browns seek to have the dismissal with prejudice and oi 
the merits reversed and the case remanded for further discovery 
and then trial on the merits pursuant to the stipulation. Browns 
contend that an unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment or 
order from which an appeal can be taken and therefore argue that, 
despite the delay between the minute entry and the motion to set 
aside the minute entry order, that this appeal in timely taken 
from the subsequent order signed by the Court and filed April 4, 
1985. Browns assert that the case should not have been dismissed 
when neither party appeared for the June 18, 1984 pretrial 
because (1) the parties had signed a stipulation that was then in 
the Court file in which the parties agreed to vacate the pretrial 
hearing until discovery was completed or until either party 
requested a pretrial hearing; and (2) that the trial court Judge, 
the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, excused both parties and their 
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attorneys from attending the pretrial conference, but simply 
forgot that he had done so when the case was called. Further, 
that a dismissal under such circumstances should not, in any 
event, be "with prejudice" and should not be denominated as "on 
the merits". 
Browns also claim that the lower court erred in 
excluding various exhibits offered to substantiate the facts 
supporting their motion to set aside the dismissal. Browns 
attack the finding that setting aside the dismissal would cause 
the Konings "substantial prejudice". Finally, Browns seek 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of this appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN<DENYING APPELLANTS1 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL. 
A. AN UNSIGNED MINUTE ENTRY IS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT 
OR ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN. THE 
COURT CANNOT DISMISS THE COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 41, 
URCP, WITHOUT A MOTION FOR DISMISSAL BY THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
Rule 58A(b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
determinative on the issue that an unsigned minute entry is not a 
final judgment or order. Rule 58A(b) requires that ". . .all 
judgments shall be signed by th£ judge and filed with the clerk." 
Rule 58A(c) states that "A judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered . . . when th© same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided." 
In Wisden v. City of Salina, (Utah, 1985) 696 P.2d 
1205, the district court had granted summary judgment in favor of 
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the City of Salina. Like the record in this case from the June 
18, 1984 minute entry until the order of April 4, 1985 following 
the hearing on Browns motion to set aside the minute entry 
dismissal, just as in Wisden, "No judgment or order signed by 
the judge as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b) and (c) appears 
in the record.11 The Supreme Court, in Wisden, held that: "An 
unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final judgment." Se 
also, Wilson v. Manning (Utah, 1982) 645 P. 2d 655. 
Thus, Browns could not have taken an appeal from that 
minute entry even if its existence had been discovered sooner. 
Since the minute entry was in Konings favor, their attorney 
should have prepared the proposed order and served the proposed 
order of dismissal on Browns counsel pursuant to Rule 2.9(b) of 
the District and Circuit Court Rules of Practice. If that had 
been done, Browns' counsel could then have filed objections, and 
the mistake and confusion would have been resolved quickly. This 
procedure is essential to properly "file" a judgment for the 
purposes of taking a proper appeal Larsen v. Larsen (Utah, 1983) 
674 P.2d 116) . The reason this procedure was not followed is 
obvious—Mr. Maycock knew it would be contrary to the stipulation 
he had signed and that it would not be fair to Browns. 
Therefore, upon discovering the minute entry, Browns 
counsel moved to set aside the purported order of dismissal. The 
new attorney for the Konings resisted the motion at the March 18, 
1985 hearing, despite the stipulation by Konings prior attorney, 
and the Court refused to set aside the dismissal. This appeal 
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was then timely taken from the order filed April 4, 1985, which 
basically affirmed the minute entry. 
Rule 41(b), Utah Pules of Civil Procedure, is 
determinative of the issue of the courtfs authority, sua sponte, 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute. That rule requires the 
Defendants to move for dismissal, and does not authorize the 
court to dismiss without such a motion by the Defendants. No 
such motion was made by Defendants, rather, Defendants stipulated 
to a continuance of the pretrial in order to complete discovery. 
In all of the following cases under Rule 41(b), a motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute had been filed: Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc. (Utah, 
1975) 544 P. 2d 876; Polk v. Ivers (Utah, 1977) 561 P. 2d 1075; 
Utah Oil Company v. J.D. Harris (Utah, 1977) 565 P. 2d 1135; and 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., (Utah, 1977) 571 P. 2d 1368. In all 
four cases, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was an abuse of 
discretion. The grounds for setting aside or vacating the order 
of dismissal by minute entry is even more compelling in this case 
than in any of the four cited cases because (1) the parties in 
this case stipulated to an indefinite continuance in order to 
either settle or complete discovery; (2) the Court was advised of 
this on at least two occasions,, and approved the stipulation or 
at least the effect thereof; (3) neither party showed up for the 
pretrial conference, and it is manifestly unfair to inflict all 
the penalty on Browns, the Plaintiffs; (4) no motion for a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute was ever filed by the 
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Defendants, and this is a prerequisite to a dismissal under Ru! 
41(b), URCP. 
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
instructive on the issue of whether the dismissal in this matte 
which operates against the Plaintiff like a default judgment 
operates against a Defendant, should be set aside for good caus 
shown by the stipulation and by the District Judge's approval o 
the stipulation. The following cases support the policy that 
default judgments and dismissals should be set aside to allow a 
trial on the merits where any reasonable excuse is offered: 
Westinghouse, supra, and Locke v. Peterson 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P 
2d 1111. 
In Westinghouse, the Supreme Court observed that: 
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatc 
and to move calendars with expedition in order to kee{ 
them up to date. But it is even more important to ke* 
in mind that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them. In conformity 
with that principle the courts generally tend to favoi 
granting relief from default judgments where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse 
party.w 
Westinghouse, was a case dealing with a Rule 41(b) motion to 
dismiss filed by the Defendant. The Konings never filed such a 
motion—on the contrary, their attorney stipulated to vacate the 
pretrial hearing so that he would have time to complete 
discovery. This is a position just the opposite of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute—it is an agreement to delay th 
matter for Konings own benefit of trial preparation. The 
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Westinghouse court also stated that: 
wIt is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition 
the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward according to the rules and 
the directions of the court, without justifiable 
excuse. But that prerogative falls short of 
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result in 
injustice." 
The dismissal in this case was arbitrary action taken against 
only the Browns without a motion to dismiss being filed as 
required by Rule 41(b), especially when, in fact, both parties 
failed to appear for the pretrial hearing. Further, there was 
ample uncontroverted justifiable excuse based upon (1) the 
stipulation signed by both parties; (2) the settlement that had 
apparently been reached by the parties? and (3) the consent 
obtained from the trial judge to be absent from the hearing. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 
WHEN NEITHER PARTY APPEARED FOR A PRETRAIL 
CONFERENCE BECAUSE THE PARTIES HAD OBTAINED 
THE COURT'S PERMISSION TO BE ABSENT AND HAD 
FILED A STIPULATION TO POSTPONE THE PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE. 
In discussing the upcoming pretrial hearing, Browns1 
attorney reminded Konings attorney that he needed to answer some 
interrogatories (T. 4: 1-5)• Upoh discovering the confusion over 
the interrogatories, an agreement was reached that Konings 
attorney would have thirty (30) more days to answer or object to 
those interrogatories. Since these interrogatories and other 
discovery needed to be completed, by both parties, it was agreed 
that the pretrial should be vacated until the discovery 
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was finished. According to that agreement, a "Stipulation 
Regarding Interrogatories" was prepared and signed by both 
attorneys, John B. Maycock signed it for and on behalf of his 
clients, the Konings. 
Although not signed by the Konings, this stipulation 
was signed by their attorney acting for and on their behalf. 
Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code provides: 
"An attorney and counselor has authority: 
(2) To bind his client in any of the steps of an actic 
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk 01 
entered upon the minutes of the court, and not 
otherwise." 
The Konings have denied that their attorney was authorized to 
stipulate to any delay in court calendar (see paragraph 6 of the 
"Affidavit Of Conrad Koning And Amy Koning In Opposition To 
Motion To Set Aside Dismissal" filed March 18, 1985 on the day o 
the hearing). This self-serving declaration carries no weight, 
as the statute expressly authorizes their attorney to bind them 
by a stipulation filed with the Court, as was done. Having 
agreed to a settlement, and then having learned that they might 
avoid the price of that settlement because of a mistaken 
dismissal, the Konings now claim there never was any settlement 
and that their attorney did not have authority to stipulate to 
any delays. 
In 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys At Law, page 207, it states: 
"An attorney of record has implied authority to do 
everything necessary and proper in the regular and 
orderly conduct of a case, provided his acts affect the 
remedy only and nqt the cause of action. . . . 
"During the progress of a trial, an attorney of record 
has implied authority to enter into stipulations and 
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agreements respecting matters of procedure, as 
distinguished from the cause of action itself. Among 
other thingsf an attorney of record may stipulate to 
advance the date of hearing, to continue the case, or 
to waive a jury trial.n 
In United States v. Berney (1983, CA10 Utah) 713 F.2d 568, the 
court said that delays do not warrant dismissal for failure to 
prosecute where the delays (late filing of memorandum) is not 
prejudicial to the parties in light of a continuance by 
stipulation. 
Not only was there a stipulation in this case, but it 
was approved by the Court as well. Since the stipulation had to 
be mailed to Salt Lake City for Mr. Maycock to sign, and then had 
to be returned to Beaver, Utah for filing with the Court, Browns1 
attorney caused a copy of the transmittal letter to Mr. Maycock 
to be filed with the Court as a reminder to the Court Clerk and 
to the trial judge of the agreement that had been reached, 
communicated to the trial judge, and approved by him. The letter 
clearly establishes that the agreement had been approved by Judge 
Burns. This letter was filed with the Court on March 22, 1984, 
some three months before the dismissal, so it is credible 
evidence that the facts therein stated actually occurred. These 
facts are also established by the long distance telephone charges 
shown on Exhibit P-2. The stipulation itself was filed later on 
April 19, 1984. 
Again, on June 15, 1984, Browns1 attorney, acting at 
the request of Mr. Maycock, again informed Judge Burns of the 
agreement to vacate the pretrial, with the additional reason that 
the parties had informed counsel that they had reached a 
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settlement. Again, the evidence is unrebutted that the Court 
approved and excused both parties from appearing at the pretri 
conference. If there had not been some such agreement, surely 
the Konings attorney would have been present. Judge Burns, wi< 
his heavy case load (T. 18: 13-17), simply forgot the 
conversation and did not look in the file before dismissing th: 
case when no one appeared on June 18, 1984, Even in the absenc 
of the stipulation and the trial court's approval, to impose a] 
the sanctions for failure to appear on one party, thereby 
benefiting the equally guilty other party, is unfair and 
inequitable. Under these circumstances, it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to allow the dismissal with prejudice an 
on the merits to stand. 
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT 
THE DISMISSAL BE "WITH PREJUDICE AND ON 
THE MERITS". 
A dismissal with prejudice and on the merits implies 
that the trial court considered the merits of the complaint 
itself and found that the complaint did not state a cause of 
action, or that the causes of action therein stated had no meri 
However, the complaint adequately sets forth three causes of 
action, each well plead and sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for 
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted. 
In the case of Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, I 
Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the complaint was in limt 
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from June 5f 1950 to May 28, 1958, when a motion was made to 
dismiss for lack of prosecution. The Supreme Court said: 
". . . Since any party to this action could have 
obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any 
time it had wanted but both parties chose to dally for 
a number of years, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the court to grant respondents1 motion to dismiss with 
prejudice." 
It must be repeated that the Konings never made any motion to 
dismiss—quite the contrary, their attorney had stipulated to a 
continuance to allow himself more time to complete discovery. 
The dismissal was a gift of the Court, one that their attorney 
would not, or at least did not, follow through on to obtain a 
written judgment or order because that would obviously be 
contrary to his stipulation. No such compunction bothered the 
Konings or their new attorney at the hearing on the motion to set 
aside the dismissal on March 18, 1985. 
In another Utah case, Utah Oil Company v. J.D. Harris, 
supra, the issue was whether or not a lapse of 16 months in 
prosecuting a claim for relief was sufficient to support a 
dismissal with prejudice, particularly where the pretrial hearing 
was stricken because the parties had apparently reached a 
compromise settlement, which, as in this case, did not come to 
fruition. There, the court held: 
w
. . . this court has been active in that area and has 
held that where all of the litigants had power to 
obtain relief and failed to do so, it is error to 
dismiss with prejudice. None of the defendants 
requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial conference 
or trial as was mandated by the court previously when 
the pre-trial was suspended by reason of settlement 
negotiations. 
"Applying the foregoing rules to the case at hand, it 
is obvious that plaintiff's lack of diligence in 
19 
prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably excusable ii 
light of the settlement efforts and had defendants bee 
anxious to proceed they need only have taken such 
affirmative step themselves. Also, no prejudice to 
defendants' position is evident while serious injustic 
may well exist as a result of the dismissal." 
To the same effect is Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., supra. The 
long standing rule is that, whenever possible, controversies 
should be resolved upon their merits and not by way of default s 
that the parties are given their day in court. Relief from a 
default judgment is addressed to the court's sound discretion, 
but that discretion is to be exercised freely and liberally 
Nounnan v. Toponce 1 Utah 168; Westinghouse, supra; Locke v. 
Peterson, supra; and Cutler v. Haycock 32 U. 354; 90 P.2d 897. 
The court cannot act arbitrarily in the denial of a 
motion to set aside a default judgment, but should be generally 
indulgent so that disputes can be settled advisedly and in 
conformity with law and justice, and it is an abuse of discretio 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the failure to appear Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951. 
Where there has been a stipulation signed by both 
parties that the pretrial hearing be vacated until discovery is 
completed or until either party thereafter requests that a new 
pretrial conference be scheduled, and neither party thereafter 
files such a request, and the trial court approves the 
stipulation, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss the case 
when neither party appears at the pretrail conference from which 
they have been excused. Further, it is an abuse of discretion tc 
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dismiss "with prejudice and on the merits", since such dismissal 
is obviously not on the merits* 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT SUBSTANTIAL 
PREJUDICE WOULD OCCUR IF THE DISMISSAL WERE 
SET ASIDE. THAT FINDING IS UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
Following the hearing held March 18, 1985 on the motion 
to set aside the dismissal by the minute entry, the court 
thereafter signed an "Order Denying Motion To Set Aside Order Of 
Dismissal" (this order is attached, see Addendum) which states 
that the trial court found that substantial prejudice would occur 
if the motion were granted. No such finding was made by the 
trial court. The court's findings are contained in the 
transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing beginning at the bottom 
of page 20 and continuing through,to the end on page 26. No 
where in that transcript does the court ever state any finding at 
all concerning substantial prejudice. The subject is not even 
addressed. Although the Konings were present at the hearing, 
they did not present any testimony. 
The only support for such a finding is contained in the 
Konings affidavit filed March 18, 1985, wherein they state that 
substantial prejudice would occur because they had sold their 
shares in Leisure Sports, Inc. However, even if they had sold 
their shares, which was not established at the hearing or found 
as a fact by the trial court, it still would not cause 
substantial prejudice since Leisure Sports, Inc. is also a 
defendant in this lawsuit. Further, since no proper final 
judgment or order of dismissal had been entered as required by 
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Rule 58A, U.R.C.P., the defendants, and any purchaser as well, 
were not entitled to rely upon a minute entry dismissal, even 
assuming they knew about the minute entry and relied upon it, 
fact which again was not found by the trial court as part of t 
decision making process. 
Although for some unknown reason it does not appear 
the transcript of the March 18, 1985 hearing, Mr. Pussell 
Gallian, who appeared at that hearing as the attorney 
representing the Konings and Leisure Sports, Inc., told the co 
that he, Russell Gallian, was the purchaser of the Konings sha 
in Leisure Sports, Inc. No testimony was offered on this poin 
just a statement by Mr. Gallian. Again, the court made no 
finding regarding this. Browns counsel cannot explain its 
absence from the transcript, and understands that this court c, 
take no action on a matter not in the record. However, if tru< 
and if as Konings affidavit states "the Konings1 Buyers (i.e., 
Mr. Gallian) relied on this dismissal as part of their decisioi 
to buy the stock of the corporation.", then a serious and obvic 
conflict of interest exists. If the status of this matter was 
misrepresented to Mr. Gallian by his clients, the Konings, thei 
he has a claim against the Konings that would preclude him fror 
representing the Konings before the court on the motion to set 
the dismissal aside, since,if the court does set it aside, thei 
the burden of Browns complaint may fall on Mr. Gallian as the 
purchaser. 
On the other hand, if Mr. Gallian simply looked into 
the matter, saw the minute entry dismissalr and relied only upc 
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that, then there has again been no substantial prejudice, since a 
minute entry is not a final judgment or order pursuant to Rule 
58A, U.R.C.P., and Mr. Gallian especially, as an attorney, would 
not be entitled to rely upon an unsigned minute entry. 
Thus, if this court reverses the order of dismissal and 
remands the case for trial, it should order that Mr. Gallian, if 
he is the purchaser of the Konings shares, cannot represent 
Konings due to the obvious conflict of interest. 
There being absolutely no findings at all concerning 
any prejudice, that portion of the order filed April 4, 1985 
should be stricken. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING VARIOUS 
EXHIBITS OFFERED TO SUPPORT THE MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL. 
At the March 18, 1985 hearing, the court excluded 
exhibits offered by Browns to support their position that the 
minute entry order should be reversed. The court improperly 
excluded Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8, P-14, P-15, P-16. 
Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7 were offered to 
show that the delays in moving the case forward were more the 
fault of the defendants than the Browns. They deal with 
difficulty in scheduling the deposition of the Konings, which was 
never taken because they had a protective order and would not 
appear for a deposition. These exhibits should have been 
received, and should be considered by this court on appeal. See 
Westinghouse, supra, regarding the conduct of both parties and 
the opportunity each party had,to move the case forward. 
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Exhibits P-3 and P-8 were offered to show that 
settlement negotiations were commenced early in the case and th< 
were being actively pursued immediately prior to the minute ent 
dismissal on June 18, 1984. These exhibits should have been 
received and should be considered by this court on appeal. See 
Utah Oil Company, supra, regarding the effect of settlement 
negotiations on such a dismissal. 
Also, Exhibit P-8 was offered as proof of the 
stipulation and agreement concerning discovery, showing that 
Konings attorney expected to "proceed with the discoveryw if 
settlement of the case was not possible. This exhibit should be 
received and considered by this court on appeal. 
Finally, Exhibits P-14, P-15, and P-16 were offered tc 
show reasonable excuse or neglect on the part of Browns1 attorne 
in not learning of the minute entry dismissal for a period of si 
months. These exhibits should also be received and considered b 
this court, although they should make no difference, since 
a minute entry order is not a final judgment or order, and if 
Konings attorney had prepared a written order for the court's 
signature and served it upon Browns1 attorney as required by Rul 
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice, Browns would have then been abl 
to object and move to set aside the minute entry order, even if 
the delay had been much longer. The Rules of Practice require 
that opposing counsel be served with the proposed order and give: 
five (5) days to object before it is submitted to the judge for 
signature. 
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IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED ON REMAND 
TO PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR THE 
DEFENSE TAKEN ON THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
DISMISSAL. THE DEFENSE IS A VIOLATION OF 
THEIR STIPULATION. SUCH A DEFENSE IS WITHOUT 
MERIT AND IS NOT ASSERTED IN GOOD FAITH UNDER 
SECTION 78-27-56 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
The Konings have taken the position that their 
attorney, John B. Maycock, was not authorized to enter into the 
stipulation vacating the pretrial conference in order for 
discovery to be completed. This stipulation was for the benefit 
of the Konings, as well as the Browns, to enable both parties to 
take depositions and do other discovery work. It also gave 
Konings an additional 30 days to answer the interrogatories, 
which were way past due. Without it, Browns attorney could have 
appeared at the pretrial conference and asked for sanctions for 
Konings failure to respond to the interrogatories. 
Konings a defense is not taken in good faith. When the 
stipulation was largely for the benefit of Konings, and served 
their purposes at the time, they should not be allowed to 
repudiate it later, when it no longer serves their purpose, just 
because the trial judge dismissed, the lawsuit when he forgot that 
he had excused the attorneys from appearing at the pretrial 
conference and failed to notice, the stipulation or the letter 
filed March 22, 1984 that were then in the court's file. 
When a defense is asserted without good faith and 
without merit, the court is*authorized by statute to impose 
attorneyfs fees to the prevailing party. Section 78-27-56 
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of the Utah Code provides that: 
"In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action i 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith." 
As has already been discussed in Point I (B) earlier in this 
brief, Section 78-51-32(2) of the Utah Code gives an attorney 
authority to bind his client by an agreement filed with the 
court. This was done. Konings actions in denying that agreerrn 
are not asserted in good faith, and this court should award 
attorney's fees to Browns for the attorney's fees incurred to 
enforce that agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the orders of the lower coi 
which denied relief from the minute entry and dismissed the 
Browns' complaint with prejudice and on the merits. The case 
should be remanded to the district court for trial and for a 
determination of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded to 
Browns to enforce the stipulation agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 ^ day of September, 
1985. 
^ ^ ^ : ft&^ 
J0HN L. MILES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellan 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Q.1-K day of September, 
1985, I hand-delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the 
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above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Russell J. Gallian, 
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for Defendants, at One South 
Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building, St. George, Utah 84770. 
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MAR 22 1984 
John B. Maycock 
Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Re: Charles Brown Construction Co, et al vs. Leisure Sports, 
Inc., et al Civil No. 4318 
Dear Mr. Maycock: 
I reached Judge Burns by telephone this morning before he took 
the bench and explained our agreement to him. He said that it 
would be fine with him. 
Enclosed are copies of the Interrogatories and a stipulation we 
should file to reflect the agreement we made. If you will sign 
it and return to me in the stamped envelope enclosed, I will fil# 
it with the Court. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter in getting the case 
back on track. For the past year I thought you were in default 
on the answers to the interrogatories while you thought my client 
was not prosecuting the case. 
Very truly yours, 
John L. Miles 
Attorney At Law 
JLM:jr 
cc: Judge J. Harlan Burns' 
Beaver County Clerk 
EXHIBIT # 
WRIGHT & MILES 
By John L. Miles 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 North 300 East 
P.O. Box 339 
St. George, UT 84770 
Phone: 628-2612 
y i P. P !i> 
APR 1 9 1984 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., 
INC., A Nevada Corporation, 
CHARLES BROWN, and CAPMA BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
LEISURE SPORTS, INC, A Nevada 
Corporation, WEST VILLAGE UNIT 
#1, MT. HOLLY RECREATION 





Civil No. 4318 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, by his attorney, John L. Miles, 
and Defendants, by their attorney, John B. Maycock, and 
stipulate: 
1. That Plaintiff's INTERROGATORIES filed on or about 
March 23, 1983 and mailed to Scott Thorley, Defendants1 former 
attorney, but not mailed to John B. Maycock, Defendants1 present 
attorney, have herewith been submitted to John B. Maycock. 
2. That Defendants should have 30 days from the date 
hereof to either answer said INTERROGATORIES or to make whatever 
objections or response thereto as Defendants deem appropriate. 
EXHIBIT # n O •> 
3. That this matter should be stricken from the 
Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties have completed their 
discovery or until either party requests a Pre-Trial Conference. 
4. That the Order To Show Cause should be stricken. 
DATED this < P 3 day of March, 1984. 
WPIGHT & MILES 
damn L. Miles 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that; I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing STIPULATION REGARDING 
INTERROGATORIES to John B. Maycock Esq., Attorney At Law, at 175 
South West Temple, #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to John 
B. Maycock, Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta, 50 West Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, on this $DjtfL&&y J*^ March, 19J 
Secretary ' 
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PWOCfflDBNG Pre-Trial Hearing 
mmm. mim 
This matter was called on for hearing for a 
JMSiMffi. 
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared on 
behalf of either party. This matter had 
been set several times for pre-trial and 
no one had ever appeared. The Court ordere 
the matter dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. The minute entry will serve 
3s the Order of Dismissal. A copy is to- bd 
mailed to the respective parties, 
ftfltiutteBsirifcNUiD-
EXHIBIT # _ 
GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
Russell J. Gallian 
Attorney for Defendant 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. O. Box 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., ] 
INC., et. al., 1 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, ' 
et. al. 
Defendants. 
| ORDER DENYING 
1 MOTION TO SET 
> SET ASIDE ORDER 
> OF DISMISSAL 
1 Civil No. -W2- ^5/5* 
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter filed its Motion to 
Set Aside this Court1s Order of Dismissal on February 20thf 1985. 
The matter was brought before the above-entitled Court on Monday, 
March 18, 1985, in conjunction with regular Law and Motion calendar. 
The Court reviewed the complete file, reviewed Affidavits, Motions, 
and Memorandums filed by the Plaintiff, together with the Affidavit 
of Konrad and Amy Koning (the former principal shareholders and 
officers of the Defendant) and considered the arguments of 
respective counsel for the parties, and the Court noting the long 
delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside and finding that substantial 
EXHIBIT a -
R8/9 
prejudice would occur if the Motion were granted; and fur 
finding that the Plaintiffs' counsel was notified of the Dismi 
shortly after June 28, 1984, and has admitted that his of 
received such notice and took no formal action with respect to 
case until the filing of their Motion that is the subject matte: 
this ruling; 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS as follows: 
That the Plaintiff fs Motion to Set Aside the Order 
Dismissal is hereby denied. 
DATED this CTL day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
J/jSaflmjBur n i 
istrict /Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foreg< 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this x 5 day of Ma. 
1985, to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit; 
John Miles, Esq. 
60 North 300 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
•Secretary 3" 
-2-
JALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL 
lussell J. Gallian 
Vttorney for Defendant 
3NE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
3IXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 1339 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., ] 
INC., et. al., ! 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, 
et. al. 
Defendants. 
i ORDER AFFIRMING | DISMISSAL WITH 
) PREJUDICE 
> Civil No. -Wir' 
THE COURT having duly noticed the above-entitled matter for a 
pre-trial on June 18, 1984, and the Court having previously entered 
pre-trials and Orders to Show Cause why the case should not be 
dismissed, and no parties having appeared on the date set by the 
Court, and the Plaintiff having failed to prosecute the action, and 
the Court having previously directed the Clerk to enter a dismissal 
of the above-entitled action with prejudice and on the merits, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the Court as follows: 
That the Minute Entry dated June 18, 1984, is hereby affirmed 
and that the signature of the Court below shall serve as the final 
$ 
R8/8 EltiiHIT# 
Order With respect to this matt 
DATED this / / daY o£////<f4-//?/ ' 1 9 8 5 





I hereby certify that a true ana correct copy of the foregoi 
document was mailed, postage prepaid this > Q *~ day of Marc 
1985, to Counsel for Plaintiff, to wit? 
John Miles, Esq. 
60 North 3Op East 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ,c,°0 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a 
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE 
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY 
RECREATION COMMUNITY, CONRAD H. 
KONING, and AMY J. KONING, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
k
 Supreme Cow t (Jtih 
Case No. 20645 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 9th day of September, 
1985, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to the law offices of Russell J. 
Gallian, GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for Defendants, at 
One South Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building, in St. George, 
Utah 84770. 
«rohr. L. Mi ] es 
Attorney For Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, postage prepaid, to 
1 
Russell J. Gallian, GALLIAN, DRAKE & WESTFALL, Attorney for 
Defendants, at One South Main Street, Dixie State Bank Building, 
St. George, Utah 84770 this 11th day of September, 1985. 
£gmx\ L. Miles 
Attorney For Defendants 
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